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31. Introduction
In his seminal work The Social Limits to Growth, Fred Hirsch (1976) argued that “as the level of
average consumption rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on a social as well as an
individual aspect. That is to say, the satisfaction that individuals derive from goods and services
depends in increasing measure not only on their own consumption but on consumption by others as
well” (Hirsch 1976, p. 2). One of the social aspects of consumption that Hirsch was concerned about
was that of status-seeking, in which individuals use consumption as a means of achieving social
status: “[G]oods and services sharing some or all of the characteristics of positional goods attract an
increasing proportion of family expenditure as family income rises” (Hirsch 1976, p. 28).1
The idea that people’s concern for social status becomes increasingly important as the general level of
income in society grows is intuitively compelling: In poor societies, the urgent demand is to satisfy
basic needs. As material goods become more abundant, basic needs are satisfied, and people may start
to care relatively more about their social position and relative economic status. If the marginal utility
of consumption per se is decreasing, an extra unit of consumption gives less utility the richer one is.
Positional goods and status, on the other hand, are relative concepts, and thus cannot be increased on
average: One individual can improve her social status, but everybody cannot simultaneously do so.
Thus, it may seem reasonable to believe that as average income increases, an increasing part of the
marginal utility of income is associated with status.
Following this line of thought, one would expect that phenomena such as excessive spending of
resources in a rat-race for status would primarily be found in rich societies. Numerous historical and
anthropological studies, however, show that status-seeking behavior is common in societies with
comparatively low levels of consumption. Recall, for example, Adam Smith’s famous passage in the
Wealth of Nations (1776), where he points out that the English of his day “would be ashamed to
appear in public” without wearing leather shoes and linen shirts; indicating that the important aspect
of one’s clothing was not just whether it was warm and comfortable, but also the effect it might have
on one’s social status. Other examples can be found in anthropological studies of so-called “gift
economies,” where the receipt of a gift imposes a duty to repay the donor with a gift of equal or
greater value (Mauss, 1954). The failure or inability to meet this obligation diminishes the perceived
status of the recipient and enhances the prestige of the gift-giver. In such societies, individuals face
strong incentives to accumulate wealth in the pursuit of relative rank.
1 Here, “positional goods” are goods which are aquired or consumed in order to obtain some kind of social position.
4An extreme version of this behavior is the potlatch ritual of the Kwakiutl people of the Pacific
Northwest, at which tribal leaders gave away or even destroyed wealth to establish relative position.
As described in Boas’ (1897, p. 353) ground-breaking ethnographic study,
“The rivalry between chiefs and clans finds its strongest expression in the destruction of
property. A chief will burn blankets, a canoe, or break a copper, thus indicating his regard of
the amount of property destroyed and showing that his mind is stronger, his power greater,
than that of his rival. If the latter is not able to destroy an equal amount of property without
much delay, his name is ’broken’. He is vanquished by his rival and his influence with his
tribe is lost, while the name of the other chief gains correspondingly in renown.”
While these observations indicate that social status is indeed important in societies with
comparatively low general income levels, the hypothesis that concern for status increases with the
general income level might still hold: Social status may, of course, be even more important to people
in richer societies. In this note, however, we will demonstrate that in general, this will hold only under
certain specifications of the utility function. Assuming that the marginal utility of consumption per se
goes to zero as the consumption level goes to infinity is not sufficient to secure the argument: Even if
it may be true that another unit of consumption gives a very small utility increment for a rich person,
more consumption is needed to win the contest for status in a rich society, implying that status
becomes more expensive. It is the relative size of these effects which determines whether status
becomes increasingly important or not, and whether an increasing portion of family expenditure is
spent on status-seeking.
2. Is status more important in rich societies?
Consider first a simple static model with n identical consumers whose utilities depend on
consumption (c) and status (s). For simplicity, we assume logarithmic utility:
(1) U u c s c s= = +( , ) ln( ) ln( )
In the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, the word “status” is explained as “person’s social,
legal or professional position or rank in relation to others” (Hornby, 1989). Thus relative standing is
the crucial aspect of the notion of status. If status can be achieved through consumption, then, it seems
reasonable to model status as some function of relative consumption.2 In economic models, status has
2 Alternatively, one might assume that status is achieved not through consumption but through wealth, education, or other
variables; for economic implications of such assumptions, see Brekke and Howarth (1998).
5frequently been formalized simply as the ratio of one’s own consumption to the average consumption
level (for example, Rauscher, 1997). Thus, we will assume that
(2) s c
c
=
where c is the average consumption level of the n consumers. Each individual regards c as
exogenous, disregarding the impact on average consumption of changes in her individual consumption
level. However, since all individuals are identical and get the same income, we have
(3) c c=
Hence, in this simple model, it will always be the case that s = 1. Although each individual may
attempt to improve her own social status by consuming more, all individuals cannot simultaneously
improve their social status; i.e., the total supply of status is fixed.3
Note that there is so far no real trade-off between status and consumption, since consuming the single
consumption good is the only way to get status. The total marginal utility of consumption comes
partly from consumption per se, and partly from the status concern:
(4) ¶
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3 Alternatively, if one does not like the idea of simply assuming that status is determined by relative consumption,
one may make the somewhat weaker assumption that status is proportional to consumption; i.e. s = qc. Here, q is
the the “price” of status, i.e. how much consumption is takes to increase status by one unit. If one takes as a
starting point that the supply of status (or positional goods) is fixed, one may normalize so that s = 1. The
equilibrium price of positional goods will thus be q c= 1 / , implying that we may arrive at the status function
s
c
c
= endogenously.
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of consumption, and the marginal utility derived via status, ¶
¶
¶
¶
u
s
s
c
, the indirect marginal utility of
consumption.
With logarithmic utility, the direct marginal utility of consumption equals 1/c, which is decreasing in
consumption and eventually goes to zero. The marginal utility of status ¶
¶
u
s s
=
1
, on the other hand,
will be constant and equal to 1 regardless of the consumption level, since s = 1. However, since
¶
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s
c c
=
1
, the indirect marginal utility of consumption ¶
¶
¶
¶
u
s
s
c
will also go to zero as consumption
increases; and in fact, with our particular choice of utility function, the direct and indirect marginal
utilities will decrease at exactly the same rate! Hence, with logarithmic utility, the marginal benefits
derived from use of material goods will be equally distributed between benefits due to direct
consumption on the one hand and status-related benefits on the other, independent of the consumption
level; and the benefits of achieving status will not dominate as material goods use goes to infinity.
This conclusion depends on the particular form of the utility function. Note first that if the utility
function is separable, i.e. U = u(c)+v(s), the indirect (status-related) marginal utility of consumption
can be written as ¶
¶
v
s c
1
. Since we always have s = 1 in equilibrium, the particular form of the utility
function matters for the indirect marginal utility of consumption only insofar as the value of ¶
¶
v
s
( )1
varies; the functional form itself does not enter the expression. Consider, for example, the case of
CRRA (constant relative risk aversion, or Box-Cox) utility function:
(5) U u c s c s= = - + - <( , ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1
g g
g
g g for
Here, as was the case with logarithmic utility, the marginal utility of status is still 1, and hence an
extra unit of consumption adds 1 c to utility. On the other hand, the marginal utility of consumption
is now c g - 1 . Hence the relative importance of the direct versus indirect contribution to utility is
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Hence, if g => 0, then the direct effect becomes increasingly important as consumption increases.
Hirsch’s conjecture that “the satisfaction that individuals derive from goods and services depends in
increasing measure not only on their own consumption but on consumption by others as well” is true
only if g =<=0.
Note that the CRRA utility function is a monotone transform of the CES-utility function
(7) U c s= + <( ) /g g g g1 1for
with elasticity of substitution s ===1/(1-g). =Hence, if consumption and status are good substitutes, the
Hirsch conjecture is wrong. As we get richer, status becomes increasingly costly, and we would like
to substitute away from it. On the other hand, if the two goods are bad substitutes, the Hirsch intuition
goes through.
Actually, as there is only one good in the model discussed this far, no actual substitution can take
place. In the next section, we will introduce a model in which consumers have a real choice between
status and consumption, and demonstrate that our argument still goes through. We will also introduce
a linear production function, thus extending the model into a simple general equilibrium model.
3. The trade-off between consumption and status
Assume now that there are two consumption goods, c1 and c2. Let us regard c1 as a pure consumption
good that does not confer social status, whereas c2 is a source of status does not yield direct
consumption benefits. This is a somewhat extreme assumption: Generally, most status-related
consumption goods will presumably also yield some direct consumption benefits. For example, while
driving a Porsche might give one a higher social status than driving a cheaper and more ordinary car,
the Porsche would probably also give a more comfortable driving experience. However, a complete
separation of status and consumption benefits simplifies the analysis, although such separation is not
crucial for the main results.
Boas’ (1897) description of the potlatch ritual of the Kwakiutl cited in the Introduction provides an
example of spending which may achieve status, but no consumption benefits: Assume that the same
resource c can be used for both status and consumption purposes, but that one can easily distinguish
